4
In theory, however, existing studies have agreed with the a priori, analytical ambiguous effect of more schooling on off-farm work. This result is based on the standard labor supply model where an individual's allocation of time between home activities, farm work, and market work are assumed to adjust so that the marginal values of time in all uses are equal. 5 Since education may enhance labor productivity in farm and nonfarm work, selectivity depends on relative returns, and it may go in either direction. Empirically, however, previous studies have not actually computed the sectoral returns to schooling. 6 Instead, researchers have specified education in off-farm labor supply or participation functions and interpreted the estimated coefficients. While positive correlations were found, causality was not explored.
In this article I investigate the determinants of educational selectivity in a framework that emphasizes the coordination of household members. Sectoral time allocation is based on members' comparative advantage, which in turn depends on the utilization and returns to schooling in the farm and nonfarm sectors. Central to the model is a knowledgespillover hypothesis that workers who participate in off-farm work may still contribute knowledge to farm management. Contributing knowledge to farming while participating in off-farm employment gives the more educated members a comparative advantage in off-farm work, allowing them to capture returns to education in both farm and nonfarm sectors.
Estimation of the model is based on cross-sectional Chinese farm household data. A novel finding is that the highest household schooling contributes the most to farm allocative efficiency and yet this contribution is not sensitive to the person's off-farm participation. There is also evidence that schooling does not contribute to physical efficiency in farming but raises off-farm wages. With these results, the implications of the model are consistent with the sample observation that the bettereducated farmers work in nonfarm activities.
II. A Model of Time Allocation
The typical farm household model adopts a static framework where the household maximizes a one-period utility function over an aggregate consumption good and leisure of its members. 7 Before each production cycle, the household is assumed to choose consumption, select purchased agricultural inputs, and determine members' labor supply to farm and off-farm work, subject to an agricultural technology and the endowed time of household members. Farm-owned assets, such as land, equipment, and members' schooling and experience, are assumed to be fixed in the short run. Their investment decisions are made in long-term planning. In addition, competitive markets exist for variable inputs, labor, the consumption good, and agricultural products. 8 For a landholding household, members typically allocate their time among home activities, work on the farm, and work off the farm. Depending on circumstances, off-farm work may be local or may take place in cities far away from rural areas. In regions with high population density, such as East Asia, local nonfarm industries employ a significant share of the rural labor force. 9 In regions such as Africa, however, nonfarm jobs are often not local. In this article, I focus on work assignments to local jobs. I do not examine the effect of education on seasonal or permanent migration decisions. 10 The income of the household may come from farming and nonfarm employment. The household carries out farm production by utilizing farm-supplied quasi-fixed factors, Z ϭ (Z 1 , . . . , Z K ); members' farm labor supply, T f ϭ (T 1f , . . . , T Nf ); and purchased inputs, X ϭ (X 1 , . . . , X J ). The production also depends on the schooling of family members, S ϭ (S 1 , . . . , S N ); their experience, E ϭ (E 1 , . . . , E N ); and other farmspecific characteristics ϕ, such as farm size and weather. Denoting Y as an agricultural production function, P A as the output price, and P X as a vector of purchased input prices, the value added in farming, V, can be represented as
This agricultural income consists of returns to the farm-supplied inputs, familial labor, and their human capital. Family members could also offer their labor services to the off-farm wage market, which is assumed to compensate workers according to their schooling, experience, and other personal and local labor market characteristics, Ω. Following standard practice, the individual wage rate is considered to be independent of hours of work. The market wage for worker i is written as
If W ϭ (W 1 , . . . , W N ) represents the market wages for family members and T o ϭ (T 1o , . . . , T No ) for off-farm labor days, the household wage income is WT o . In conjunction with agricultural earnings, the total household cash income is WT o ϩ (P A Y Ϫ P X X).
Assuming utility maximization over consumption goods and leisure of household members, the farm household's decisions may be solved through the standard Lagrangian problem. At the optimum, the marginal utility of consumption equals the commodity price. The values of marginal product of variable inputs (X) reflect their marginal costs. The time allocation for household members is guided by their marginal value of home time, the value marginal product in farming, and the wage rate in off-farm work. One may specialize in off-farm work if one's compensation consistently exceeds the returns from farming, or vice versa. One may also split the time across the two activities, equating alternative marginal earnings. There are optimal conditions of time allocation for each member of the household.
These standard solutions, as they stand, do not suggest any determining effects of accumulated schooling on farm versus off-farm work. Added schooling may raise an individual's off-farm wage, but at the same time it may raise one's productivity in farming. To explain the accrued empirical evidence that the better-educated farmers first supply their family labor off the farm, additional analysis is needed.
Under utility maximization, optimal labor assignments of the household depend on each member's relative productivity in wage and farm activities. In the current model, family members' schooling may affect their productivity differentials in the dual sectors because individual schooling directly enters farm production and wage functions. Household and labor market variables, such as the labor market characteristics (Ω) in equation (2) and the farm-owned and purchased inputs in farming, are not likely to affect members' relative productivity because those are the same for all members. Other human capital variables, such as gender and experience, may also determine a member's relative productivity. The analysis of these variables is given in Section III. I will focus here on the role of formal schooling.
More specifically, consider labor productivity of two members, i and j. Since the wage employment condition (Ω) is the same for both, the reduced form of their wage functions can be written as W(S i ) and W(S j ). In farm production, the value marginal product (VMP) of a member is defined by partially differentiating the farm value added function, V ϭ P A Y(X, Z, T f , S, E; ϕ) Ϫ P X X, with respect to the member's labor input T f , VMP ϭ ∂P A Y(X, Z, T f , S, E; ϕ)/∂T f . At a given level of inputs, the reduced form of i's and j's VMP may be written as VMP(S i ) and VMP(S j ), respectively. When the years of schooling of i and j differ, their VMPs and W's are expected to differ. Now consider the job assignment of i and j in agriculture and wage activity. For simplicity of exposition, assume S i Ͼ S j . Given the current inputs in farming (X, Z, T f , S, E; ϕ) and labor market condition Ω, the principle of comparative advantage suggests the following time allocation based on relative marginal productivity:
The utility-maximizing household follows these rules to decide the time allocation for family members. When VMP(S i ) Ͼ W(S i ) and VMP(S j ) Ͼ W(S j ) or when VMP(S i ) Ͻ W(S i ) and VMP(S j ) Ͻ W(S j ), families will specialize in only one occupation.
11 When the family supplies labor to both sectors, the question of educational selectivity arises. Consider case (3a). The household will first assign i for wages so that i may divide his work time between two jobs while j works full-time on the farm. One may also observe that i works full-time off the farm while j divides his work time. The case in which i works on the farm while j works for wages will not occur because it violates the theory of comparative advantage. Switching work duties may increase family income. The work assignments for workers i and j are reversed in case (3c). When (3b) is the case, the household is indifferent to assigning its members to either sector because nobody has sectoral comparative advantage.
The time-allocation rules in (3) suggest a set of sufficient conditions for educational selectivity. In particular, if schooling differences result in a larger productivity disparity in wage employment than they do in farming, families will assign the better-educated members to work off the farm. Therefore, factors that determine smaller productivity differentials in farming are the cause of educational selectivity.
I argue here that the utilization and returns to education are systematically different in farming than they are in wage activities. A large body of research has studied returns to schooling in wage activities, using the empirical earning function pioneered by J. Mincer, 12 and a consis-tent positive relationship between schooling and wage rates, regardless of time, place, and the nature of the data sets, has been found. 13 In studies of agricultural productivity, it has been hypothesized that education enhances a worker's physical productivity and the efficiency of making allocative decisions.
14 Empirical studies by D. P. Chaudhri, W. Huffman, G. Fane, N. Khaldi, and others proceeded to decompose the productivity gains of more educated farmers into labor efficiency and allocative effects. 15 In a team production model, I used the highest schooling of farm members to approximate managerial skills and a weighted education scheme to approximate labor quality. I found that the highest farm schooling is the most important education variable to explain farm efficiency. 16 Building on my earlier analysis, this article advances the idea that off-farm employment of the better-educated household members may not affect the effectiveness of contributing knowledge to farm decisions. It is well known that in farming, typical allocative decisions include selecting a combination of crops; purchasing a mix of variable inputs; allocating the inputs among alternative uses; deciding when to cultivate, plant, water, and harvest; as well as selling the final products. These decisions usually do not require instant judgment at the work sites. Since the more educated members reside in their rural homes, it is expected that they communicate with other family members and contribute to decision making regardless of where they work.
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In regard to the assignment conditions in equation (3), it is argued that centralized allocative decision making may be important in farming where the better-educated members take primary responsibilities. They may contribute knowledge to production despite participation in off-farm work because many of them still work and live on the farms. These close involvements allow communication with other family members. 18 This hypothesis suggests that the returns to education in allocative decision making are realized at the family level. On the other hand, the returns to individual education are likely to be reflected in the quality of routine labor inputs, such as driving a tractor or watering plants. If the returns to schooling are low in these manual activities, labor inputs of different schooling levels are close substitutes. Consequently, the better-educated members may have a comparative advantage in wage employment.
The effect of schooling on labor quality and managerial skills for farm households can be modeled more explicitly. Let X * (Z, T f , S, E; P A , P X , ϕ) represent the optimal use of variable inputs. If X * is substituted into (1), the value-added function may be expressed as V ϭ V(Z, T f , S, E; P A , P X , ϕ). To clarify further the role of schooling in production, two terms have to be defined: first, a quality-adjusted labor unit H(T f , S), where T f represents workers' labor days and S their schooling, such that ∂H/∂T f Ն 0 and ∂H/∂S i Ն 0; and second, a function M for the farm's managerial ability, which depends on the highest schooling (S M ), the av-erage schooling of farm members other than the most educated worker (S AO ), and an off-farm work participation variable for the most educated worker (OP SM ). If the most educated worker participates in off-farm employment, OP SM ϭ 1; OP SM ϭ 0 otherwise.
19 I hypothesize that the ''most educated'' worker is the leading candidate for manager. While any education contributes conceptually to managerial skills, the added schooling of the most educated workers may contribute the most in making allocative decisions. The variable S AO reflects the potential contribution of other family workers. The inclusion of OP SM is to capture the interactive relationship between the education of the most educated family member and that member's off-farm participation. Denoting the managerial function as M(S M , S AO , OP SM ) and omitting the farm characteristics ϕ and competitive prices P A and P X for simplicity of exposition, a reduced form valueadded function may be expressed as
In addition to education, the experience and gender of the most educated worker may affect managerial quality. Without specifying the functional details here, later empirical analysis will assess the role of other human capital variables. Equation (4) provides a framework for assessing the returns to individual human capital on the farm. The managerial function M(S M , S AO , OP SM ) allows the better-educated worker to make farm decisions and permits a test for sharing knowledge with off-farm participation. The efficiency labor unit, H(T f , S), sets a basis for estimating the returns to schooling through direct labor services, such as carrying out specific tasks. This information is crucial for understanding the relative productivity of farm workers who have different levels of schooling. When the returns to schooling in wage activities are also estimated, implications of labor assignments may be derived from the comparative advantage principles in equation (3) . Consequently, the validity of the theoretical implications can be judged in light of the observed educational selectivity.
III. Empirical Hypotheses and Specifications
Considering its computational ease and extensive use in previous studies, the Cobb-Douglas form is selected for the value-added function in equation (4). If we assume that the managerial variable M(S M , S AO , OP SM ) affects efficiency through a mutual displacement function g, V is written as
where Z represents farm-supplied quasi-fixed inputs, including cultivated land, A, and capital services, K.
For estimation it is necessary to specify the functional forms of M(S M , S AO , OP SM ) and H(T f , S).
A straightforward measurement of labor in efficiency units is obtained by multiplying an individual's formal schooling by the number of days the person worked on the farm. I denote worker i's total farming days as T if and schooling as S i . The labor input in efficiency units can be expressed as T if S i . Consequently, the qualityadjusted farm labor input is
where T f denotes the total working days of all farm workers in a given production period, and S W is a measure of worker's education weighted by the proportion of their farm labor participation. This variable reflects the quality of labor in direct production. The management variable is specified as
where the highest schooling (S M ) and the average schooling of other workers (S AO ) approximate the managerial capacity of the farm. The product of S M and OP SM reflects the concern that the contribution of knowledge by the most educated worker may be affected by his or her off-farm participation. If the interactive term is insignificant empirically, it supports the knowledge-sharing hypothesis. Substituting the specifications of equations (6) and (7) into equation (5) and explicating the farm-supplied inputs Z, we have
Assuming the exponential form e α W S W for (S W ) β T and e
, a more specific Cobb-Douglas function becomes:
The OLS estimation of equation (8) is widely used in the literature and adds a stochastic disturbance term, ⑀, to the human capital variables in the parentheses. 21 It is often assumed that ⑀ only affects the dependent variable and not the independent variables in the equation. 22 Examples that justify the use of ⑀ include weather variations and unexpected changes in input and output prices. When ⑀ is independent of the productive inputs, the OLS estimation is unbiased.
However, T f in equation (8) is a potentially endogenous variable, which may be affected by the education of household members, their offfarm work opportunities, and other variables. Consequently, OLS estimation of the function may be subject to simultaneous equation bias where the unobserved factors in the error term may affect both T f and V. To deal with the endogeneity, an instrumental variable approach will be presented. I chose the number of family workers as an instrument for T f because it is expected to be correlated with family labor inputs in farming but not with the value added by current farm operations. I performed regressions of T f on the number of familial workers and all other exogenous variables in the V function. I used the predicted value of T f for fitting equation (8) . I then interpret the results of instrumental variable estimation and compare them with the OLS estimates.
The specification of land as an exogenous variable also needs explanation. It is often observed that farmers with more schooling have more land, suggesting that A may also be an endogenous variable that requires econometric correction. This concern is not necessary in China, however, because the distribution of land is independent of farmers' schooling attainment. Under the Chinese Household Responsibility System, collective organizations allocate land to households according to both population and size of labor force. 23 The duration of land contracts is often more than 15 years. 24 In addition, land rentals are often prohibited or limited. Among the sample of 204 households used for this article, only three households rented land from other families in 1989 while only four households leased land. This information provides justification for treating land as an exogenous variable.
Taking natural logarithms of equation (8), the basic functional form for estimation is
where ln V is the dependent variable; S W , S AO , S M , OP SM , ln A, ln T f , and ln K are independent variables; and α and β are parameters to be estimated. Standard to the Cobb-Douglas form, the parameters α W , α AO , and α M give the percentage increases in V in response to a unit increase in the education variables. The parameters β A , β T , and β K give the elasticities of the value added with respect to the farm-supplied factors.
Hypotheses concerning the role of education in farm production can be briefly summarized. Schooling may improve the quality of labor by making workers more efficient in their performance of routine tasks. Symbolically this implies ∂V/∂S W Ͼ 0 or α W Ͼ 0. The null hypothesis is ∂V/∂S W ϭ 0 or α W ϭ 0, indicating that education does not affect physical efficiency. When the schooling of the most educated member improves farm management, we expect ∂V/∂S M Ͼ 0 or α M Ͼ 0. The null hypothesis that S M does not affect efficiency implies ∂V/∂S M ϭ 0 or α M ϭ 0. The same interpretation applies to the education of other family workers (S AO ) and its coefficient (α AO ). The hypothesis that knowledge contribution by the most educated worker is not negatively affected by his participation in off-farm work is consistent with ∂V/∂S M ∂OP SM ϭ 0 or α OP ϭ 0. If participation reduces the effectiveness of knowledge sharing, we expect that ∂V/∂S M ∂OP SM Ͻ 0 or α OP Ͻ 0.
The estimation of equation (9) will provide information on returns to education in farming. To make predictions about sectoral labor assignments, however, one has to estimate returns to schooling in off-farm earnings. The standard human capital earnings function will be fitted to all observations with reported wage work:
where W is the wage rate for a nonfarm worker. The schooling coefficient, β S , provides an estimate for the rate of return to education, which is assumed to be a constant parameter. The quadratic experience terms, E and E 2 , allow concave wage profiles. When the returns to education in farm and off-farm activities are estimated, the comparative advantage principles in equation (3) will offer specific implications on labor assignments by schooling. For instance, suppose education does not improve physical efficiency but enhances decision-making skills. If knowledge spillover takes place in farming, any positive returns to education in nonfarm activities would give the bettereducated members comparative advantage in that sector and give the farm household incentives to assign them to wage work. One may further examine whether this implication confirms the observed patterns of labor assignments.
IV. Data and Results
The data for this study consist of a 1990 cross section of 204 Chinese farm households that were randomly selected from Sichuan Province. Sichuan is located in the central part of China and is the most populated province. Its per capita income is slightly lower than the national average. The main farm activities include growing wheat, vegetables, and sweet potatoes, and animal husbandry. The main nonagricultural jobs in the sampled regions are in food processing, liquor factories, manufacturing, construction, and retail. 
Summary Statistics
Information on farm average production and income is reported in table 1. Farm gross income consists of total value of agricultural produce plus labor earnings from wage employment. It is evident that agriculture is the major source of farm incomes. The value added in farming is equal to the gross value of crops and animal husbandry minus the variable costs of crops and raising animals. Variable costs of crops include expenditures on hired labor, seeds, fertilizer, pesticide, manure, equipment rentals, and miscellaneous fees. The costs of fertilizer and manure account for the largest share among the variable costs. The expenses on hired labor are very limited. In regard to the variable cost of raising animals, feed cost is the major item. Notice that the value added in farming consists of returns to the farm-supplied inputs, including land, capital, family labor services, and human capital.
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Table 1 also shows that the sample farms are small. The size of the cultivated land of an average farm is only 1.18 acres. The average replacement value of farm equipments is 480.1 yuan, which is about one- Note.-Numbers in parentheses are the probabilities that the null hypotheses (coefficient ϭ 0) cannot be rejected.
sixth of the farm annual gross income. The average farm labor input is roughly equal to 1.5 full-time annual labor. A labor day is defined on an 8-hour basis.
The demographic characteristics of farm workers are, in brief, as follows. The average number of familial workers is 2.5 for the sampled households. 26 The average age is 33.2 years while the average years of schooling is 6.0. Notice that the standard deviation for schooling is 2.8, indicating variations in educational attainment. Information on the average highest level of schooling (S M ) and the schooling of other family members (S AO ) is an alternative indicator for intrahousehold schooling differences; S M ϭ 7.3 and S AO ϭ 4.7 years of schooling are roughly matched with the attainment of junior high and elementary school graduates. This difference can be important in affecting production efficiency.
The small number of workers on individual farms may cause econometric difficulties to include various human capital measures in an empirical function because of possible intervariable multicollinearity. Table  2 reports a correlation matrix of human capital variables, including the highest schooling (S M ), the average schooling of other members (S AO ), schooling weighted by farm participation defined in equation (6) (S W ), experience weighted by farm participation (E W ), and the highest level of experience (E M ). Relatively high correlations are found among the schooling variables and between the experience variables. 27 In later regression analyses, these facts will be used to guide empirical specifications and to interpret results. Table 3 cross-tabulates the percentage of frequency distribution and the education of farmers according to their time allocation between farm and off-farm activities. In the first part of the table, each cell corresponds Column total (%) to a specific combination of on-farm and off-farm workdays. The percentage figures reveal some tendency toward specialization. Farmers who engage primarily in one occupation and work fewer than 60 days per year in another occupation account for more than 87% of the total workforce. Only about 13% of the workforce rather evenly allocate their work between the farm and the off-farm sectors. Another way to determine the tendency toward specialization is to trace along the bottom-left versus top-right diagonal cells, which have the same total labor supply in farm and nonfarm activities. The frequency distributions tend to increase toward the two ends, indicating sectoral work specialization. The second part of table 3 reports the average schooling of workers conditional on off-farm labor supply. The average years of schooling for those who did not work off the farm (D ϭ 0) in the survey year is 5.51. Those who worked more than 300 days off the farm have on average 7.47 years of schooling. Generally, the average schooling increases consistently with the extent of off-farm employment.
In short, the data reveal two patterns of farmers' labor supply and schooling: (1) there is a tendency for specialization in one work location, and (2) better-educated farmers allocate more time in the wage sector. I will now assess the role of education in farming and wage activities and attempt to explain the revealed educational selectivity. Table 4 reports the results of instrumental variable (IV) estimation after correcting for the potential endogeneity of family labor supply (T f ). The number of household members in the labor force is used as the instrument. First, T f is regressed on the instrument and all other explanatory variables in column (1) of table 4. 28 Then the predicted values of T f are used for the regressions. In comparison with OLS results, the IV approach supports the same basic conclusions. After correction, however, the coefficients of lnT f have generally increased in size and the experience variables, E W and E 2 W , have become statistically more significant. Overall, the IV approach provides a better fit for the regressions, raising the adjusted R 2 s by about 2%-3% for each specification. Because of these improvements, only the IV results are presented and interpreted.
Estimation Results
Among the 204 households in the sample, I dropped six in the regressions because of no record of agricultural production, zero or negative value added in farming, or no family members in the labor force. The dependent variable of the regressions is the logarithm of the value added in farming lnV. Regression (1) is the basic Cobb-Douglas production function specified in equation (9) with labor quality approximated by S W and management approximated by S M and S AO . 29 The experience variable weighted by farm participation (E W ) and its quadratic term (E 2 W ) are also included in the regression. An alternative specification may include E W and the highest level of experience (E M ) as explanatory vari- Regression (1) shows the contribution of farm-supplied inputs to the value added in farming. Land (A) contributes a major share, which reflects its scarcity in the Chinese agriculture. Labor's (T f ) contribution is the second highest among household resources. The flow of capital services (K) is the sum of tool replacement value plus the depreciation of major machineries adjusted by their effective days of use in agriculture. Its contribution is positively significant, yet quite small. These share estimates are similar to those of other production studies of small-scale farming. 31 The implied marginal productivity of these farm-supplied in-puts are, respectively, 781 yuan per acre for land, 1 yuan per day for labor, and 0.12 yuan for each yuan of capital. These results suggest that land has relatively high returns in Chinese agriculture, that labor marginal productivity in farming is below the sample mean wage rate (4.65 yuan) in nonfarm work, and that agricultural capital has approximately 12% of annual returns. In regression (1) the coefficient of the weighted schooling S W , which approximates labor quality in direct production, has an insignificant tvalue. The implication is that an increase in workers' schooling improves positively but not significantly their operational skills. The coefficient of S M is positive and significant, giving support to the hypothesis that the highest education improves allocative decision making. This coefficient implies that if one additional year of schooling above the sample mean is added to the most highly educated member, the farm value added will increase by 3.3%. Similar to S W , the coefficient of S AO has a positive but insignificant coefficient. The estimates for the experience variables are also consistent with expectation. The positive experience coefficient and the smaller and negative quadratic coefficient indicate a standard concave profile that experience enhances farm efficiency at a decreasing rate.
Regressions (2)- (4) present interactions of the highest schooling with the person's gender, experience, and off-farm participation status. The last interaction is of particular importance because it tests the knowledge-sharing hypothesis within the household. Another change is that specifications (2)-(4) omit schooling variables S W and S AO . Table 2 shows that the correlation coefficient between S M and S W is .702 and between S M and S AO is .673, which are both high relative to the adjusted R 2 in the first regression. To avoid multicollinearity, regressions (2)-(4) only include schooling variable S M , which has the highest statistical significance in regression (1). 32 Regressions (2)-(4) reveal that the returns to land (A), familial labor (T f ), capital (K), and experience (E, E 2 ) are quite stable with alternative specifications. The coefficients of S M are all positive and highly significant, indicating that the highest schooling enhances allocative decision making. In the sample, the highest-educated members in 63 households are females. The interaction of a gender dummy (female ϭ 1, male ϭ 0) with S M in regression (2) has an insignificant coefficient, which implies that gender does not affect the quality of decision making. In regression (3) the coefficient of interaction between S M and the experience of the most educated member (E SM ) also has a low t-value, which implies that increased experience does not significantly complement schooling. In addition, the interactive term S M OP SM in specification (4) has a statistically insignificant coefficient. This result suggests that the participation of off-farm wage earnings by the highest-educated worker does not affect the quality of his or her decision making on the farm. In the sample, workers with the highest schooling worked on average 76.3 days per year (SD ϭ 108.5 days) off the farm. Their knowledge contribution remained important in farming, which gives support to the knowledge-spillover hypothesis.
The estimates on returns to education in off-farm employment by fitting OLS to equation (10) are: The estimated coefficients of the human capital variables are all statistically significant. The results indicate that women earn less than men do. 34 The rate of return to education is 2.3% in wage earnings with a sample average daily rate at 4.65 yuan. This rate for China is relatively low compared with those for other developing countries. 35 Widely adopted wage controls in China may depress the returns to education and result in the low rate. The coefficients for experience and experience squared are 0.025 and Ϫ0.0004, implying that wage growth is about 2.5% at the beginning of one's working life and that with more experience wages increase at a decreasing rate. Wages are maximized at about 56 years of experience. These results reveal fairly standard effects of experience on ln W.
In brief, the above results indicate three empirical facts concerning labor productivity and returns to schooling for the sample. First, labor productivity with respect to routine tasks is the same for household members, regardless of their years of schooling. Second, the bettereducated members may contribute to agricultural management while participating in off-farm wage activities. And third, schooling increases offfarm wage rates. Given these results, equation (11) suggests that the better-educated workers have a comparative advantage in off-farm work and the corresponding selective assignments by education maximize the household income. If the household violates the comparative advantage principles by assigning less educated members to work for wages and better-educated members to work on the farm, the household will not realize the potential gain of knowledge spillover, that is, the wage difference between members with different schooling in nonfarm employment.
The observed patterns of time allocation are consistent with the implications of optimal assignments. Table 3 shows that rural workers tend to specialize in one sector, and table 4 shows that off-farm workers are generally better educated than farm workers. These observations confirm that farm households behave according to comparative advantage principles and respond to local production and labor market conditions.
V. Summary and Further Implications
As a basic economic unit the farm household typically shares all productive resources. Formal schooling of household members is an asset by which the household is able to capture its maximum returns. In this article, I have investigated the possibility that knowledge sharing within a household is a cause of educational selectivity of off-farm family labor supply. If the most educated worker makes managerial decisions on the farm while working off the farm for wages, the household will realize the returns to this member's education in both the farm and off-farm sectors. This selective arrangement by education maximizes household income.
Data from Chinese farm households reveal work specialization and the selection of better-educated workers in off-farm activities. These observations are consistent with the comparative advantage implications derived from the returns to education conditions estimated for the sample. The findings are that schooling does not enhance labor productivity when carrying out routine tasks, that the contribution to farm efficiency by the most educated members is not affected by their nonfarm participation, and that schooling increases labor market wage rates. These empirical results give comparative advantage for the better-educated farmers to work off the farm.
In developing countries, nonfarm activities in rural areas have become increasingly important. Existing studies of education and development policies have typically examined the returns to individual schooling at a particular job. The current study indicates that returns to education may not be limited to individuals or to the sector of their work. Knowledge may spill over to other household members, creating additional returns. This result calls for a reassessment of the role of education in farm household behavior and in generating farm household earnings. 
